










SILENT INTERESTS AND ALL-PAY AUCTIONS 
 
 
KAI A. KONRAD 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1473 














An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com









If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce 
asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large 
share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As 
a consequence, equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocated 
less efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the profits of the 
firms involved in the ownership relationship but without these negative efficiency effects. 
JEL Code: D44, L11, L41. 
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 1 Introduction
It is common for a ﬁr mt oo w nm i n o r i t ys h a r e si na n o t h e rc o m pe t i n gﬁrm, and
these shareholdings are often small and not suﬃcient to give the ﬁrm that
owns them formal control rights.1 As discussed, for instance, in Reynolds
and Snapp (1986), shareholdings of ﬁrm A in ﬁrm B may soften competition
and increase industry proﬁts, but most of these beneﬁts go to outsiders or
to ﬁrm B. In Cournot markets, ﬁrms therefore have little or no incentive to
acquire shares in a market competitor (Reitman, 1994). Investing unilaterally
in silent shareholdings can be proﬁtable, depending on the shape of cost
functions and the type of competition, as has been shown by Farrell and
Shapiro (1990), Flath (1991) and Reitman (1994), but when the owners of a
ﬁrm A acquire a partial interest without control rights in a ﬁrm B,t h e r ei sa
general tendency for this to beneﬁt the owners of ﬁrm B and other ﬁrms more
than the owners of ﬁrm A. Minority shareholdings, or even cross-ownership
holdings, are also mixed blessings with respect to the sustainability of tacit
collusion (Malueg, 1992).2
Even though competition in auctions is an important part of modern busi-
ness interaction, the role of minority shareholdings is less well understood in
such auction markets. Ettinger (2002, 2003) and Dasgupta and Tsui (2004)
are among the few contributions. However, they consider auctions, not all-
1See, e.g., Gilo (2000) for some empirical evidence.
2Minority shareholdings and the incentives an individual ﬁrm has to acquire such hold-
ings must be distinguished from the problem of forming a coalition in terms of mutual
cross-holdings or joint ventures, where both sides share in the beneﬁts of reduced compe-
tition in a symmetric fashion. Mutual cross-holdings are much more likely to be proﬁtable
for all participants for a broad range of market games (see, e.g., Kwoka, 1992).
1pay auctions3 and do not address the issue of whether acquiring shares in an-
other ﬁrm is individually rational and proﬁtable in such a context.4 Chillemi
(2004) considers auctions and all-pay auctions with incomplete information
with cross-holdings that fulﬁll a speciﬁc symmetry requirement. Structurally
related problems emerge in auctions with externalities more generally.5
All-pay auctions are the mode of competition between ﬁrms when they
compete for market shares by advertizing and other marketing activities (see,
e . g . ,S c h m a l e n s e e ,1 9 7 6 ) ,w h e nﬁrms compete for large projects and spend
resources, for instance, in beauty contests, like in architecture, in the compe-
tition for spectrum rights in telecomunications in some countries (see, e.g.,
Börgers and Dustmann, 2003, p. 223 for a country survey) or in markets with
strong network externalities in which ﬁrms compete for a de facto natural
monopoly. This type of competition has been discussed in more detail, e.g.,
in Huck, Konrad and Müller (2001) and Konrad (2000).
Here competition between ﬁrms will be analysed if the mode of compe-
tition is an all-pay auction with complete information and if one ﬁrm has a
silent minority interest in one of the other ﬁrms. It turns out that the acqui-
sition of minority shareholdings in a competitor can be in the interest of both
the owners of the buying ﬁrm and the majority owners of the ﬁrm in which
minority shareholdings are acquired. The ﬁrm with the highest valuation of
3An all-pay auction with diﬀerent externalities is considered in Engers and McManus
(2002).
4R&D processes often take a special form of a contest. For an analysis of the role
of complementarity of research inputs in non-cooperative joint ventures and a literature
survey see Anbarci, Lemke and Roy (2002).
5A key contribution to auction theory with externalities is Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stac-
chetti (1996).
2winning the auction prize may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to purchase a minority share
in the ﬁrm with the second highest valuation of winning, and, given these
shareholdings, may then abstain from bidding in the equilibrium. The results
in this paper provide a partial solution to the more general problem of an
all-pay auction with externalities in a framework with complete information.6
In section 2 the general structure of the problem that is analysed here is
described in more detail. The benchmark equilibrium without shareholdings
as in Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) is discussed in section 3. Minority
shareholdings and their proﬁtability and welfare properties are analysed in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The problem structure
Consider a set N of ﬁrms i =1 ,...n which compete for winning a prize in an
all-pay auction with completely informed bidders. The prize can, for instance,
be winning a business contract in a contest, and the ﬁrm’s valuation vi de-
notes the operating business surplus which this ﬁrm generates from receiving
and fulﬁlling this business contract. Let ﬁr m sb es o r t e da n dn u m b e r e ds u c h
that v1 ≥ v2 > ... > vn.7
Each ﬁrm i can make a bid xi ≥ 0. It has to pay this bid in full, in-
6For all-pay auctions with externalities only partial results exist. The symmetric case
in which the prize is a public good to some group of competitors that has been considered
in Baik, Kim and Na (2001), is one example.
7Cases with further non-strict inequalities, particularly with v2 = v3, lead to a multi-
plicity of equilibria that is avoided here for simplicity. For a complete description of the
equilibria for other non-strict inequalities in the all-pay auction with complete information
and without externalities see Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996).
3dependent of whether the ﬁrm wins the prize or not. The bid in an all-pay
auction is like an up-front eﬀort that is irreversibly lost once it is chosen. In
what follows, the ‘bid’ will sometimes be called ‘the ﬁrm’s eﬀort’ in order to
emphasize its non-contingent nature.
The outcome of the all-pay auction is determined as follows. The prize is
awarded to the ﬁrm that makes the highest eﬀort. If several ﬁrms make the
same highest eﬀort, the prize is awarded to each of these ﬁrms with the same
probability. More formally, let M denote the set of ﬁrms j for which xj ≥ xk
for all k ∈ N,a n dl e t#M be the number of ﬁrms in M. The probability
that i wins the contest is a function of all contestants’ eﬀorts, and is denoted
as
pi = pi(x1,x 2,...xn)=
1
#M
if i ∈ M and pi =0otherwise. (1)
Given the operating surplus vi, bid cost xi and the contest success function
pi,w ec a nd e ﬁne the operating proﬁt of a ﬁrm as
πi = pivi − xi.( 2 )
If ﬁrms do not own shares in another ﬁrm, this operating proﬁti sw h a tt h e
ﬁrm maximimizes and what is distributed among the shareholders.
Firms may own or aquire shares in other ﬁrms. For instance, ﬁrm i may
own a minority share θij in ﬁrm j. To be ‘silent’, the minority share should
be limited to θij ∈ [0,1/2).8 One could also consider cross ownership or
the equilibrium ownership structure of shares more generally, but, in what
follows, I restrict attention to θkl ≡ 0 for all ﬁrms k 6= i and l 6= j.I a s k
how this transaction changes the nature of the all-pay auction equilibrium.
8What makes this question interesting is that a merger or take-over may be subject to
merger control in situations in which obtaining a silent minority share is not.
4If ﬁrm i owns a share θij in ﬁrm j, this changes the overall proﬁto ft h i sﬁrm
to
Wi = πi + θijπj.( 3 )
Each ﬁrm will generally maximize this overall ﬁrm proﬁt Wi,w h i c h ,f o r
θij =0reduces to Wi = πi.9
A silent share ownership θij will be called mutually proﬁtable if a change
in the ownership structure from θij =0to this θij > 0 increases the sum of
operating proﬁts of ﬁrms i and j. Mutual proﬁtability is a suﬃcient condition
for a mutually beneﬁcial trade of shares between the owners of ﬁrm i and the
owners of ﬁrm j. Which silent share ownership is mutually proﬁtable will be
analysed, but the market mechanism that is used to implement this trade is
not considered.10
A second question will be whether the silent share ownership increases or
decreases the expected value that is generated from the equilibrium allocation







9One could also go one step further and consider the private ownership structure of
ﬁrms and how the private owners may induce managers not to maximize ﬁrm proﬁtb u t
some other objective function (see, e.g., Bolle and Güth, 1992). In line with the standard
assumptions in the literature on ﬁrm crossholdings, however, I will assume ﬁrms to maxi-
mize their own overall proﬁt. This is in line with full rationality, for instance, if each ﬁrm
is controlled by majority shareholders who do not have cross-holdings in competitors of
this ﬁrm.
10Depending on the dispersion of share ownership, such deals may also cause free rider
problems, and the trading mechanism, together with the initial share ownership, will
inﬂuence the share price for which the share trading may take place. The focus here is
constrained to the question whether a mutually proﬁtable deal exists.
5will be called measure of social value of the equilibrium allocation of the
prize. The maximum social value is reached if V =1 , i.e., if the ﬁrm with
the highest valuation v1 receives the prize with probability 1. Social value
V will generally be a function of θij, as ownership shares may change the
equilibrium win probabilities pi. This social value is also an appropriate
measure of social welfare in cases in which eﬀort is simply a transfer.
3 The equilibrium for θij =0
If θij =0 , ﬁrms compete in an all-pay auction without externalities and each
ﬁrm i maximizes πi as in (2). The equilibrium has been fully described by
Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) for any type of prize structure. The
result applied to the ﬁrms context here is stated as
Proposition 1 (Baye, Kovenock and deVries, 1996) Let there be n ﬁrms
with valuations v1 ≥ v2 > ... > vn of the prize. Let each ﬁrm maximize
(2) by a choice of non-negative eﬀort xi in an all-pay auction with complete
information. The unique auction equilibrium is in mixed strategies as follows.
Firm 1 chooses eﬀort x1 ∈ (0,v 2] according to a cumulative distribution
function
F1(x1)=x1/v2, (5)
ﬁrm 2 chooses eﬀort x2 ∈ [0,v 2] according to
F2(x2)=( 1− (v2/v1)) + x2/v1, (6)
and ﬁrms k =3 ,...n choose zero eﬀort. The equilibrium expected eﬀorts are
Ex
∗







k ≡ 0 for k =3 ,...n, (7)
6and the payoﬀsa r e
π
∗
1 = v1 − v2 and π
∗
k =0for all k =2 ,...n. (8)
This result has been used in many applications. It is well known by now,
and a proof will not be repeated here. The equilibrium of the full-information
all pay auction is in mixed strategies. Only the two top ﬁrms (the ones who
value winning the auction most highly) participate in the auction and make
positive bids. They randomize their eﬀort uniformly in the interval between
zero and v2, and choose a density that makes the only rival bidder who
actively participates just indiﬀerent with respect to all eﬀort choices in this
interval. The solution is characterized by a mass point at zero eﬀort for the
player with the second highest valuation v2. The solution translates into
expected eﬀort choices and payoﬀs that are fairly simple and depend only on
v2 a n do nt h ed i ﬀerence between v1 and v2. In particular, only the player
who values winning the most gets a positive payoﬀ, and this payoﬀ is equal to
the diﬀerence v1−v2 between this player’s own valuation of winning and the
second highest valuation of winning. The allocation of the prize in the all-
pay auction with complete information is ineﬃcient, at least in expectation,
unless v1 = v2. The social value is V =1− v2
2v1
v1−v2
v1 . A key property of
this equilibrium for explaining the results in what follows is that an increase
in v1 does not change ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium strategies, but changes player 2’s
bidding behavior and increases the probability that player 2 bids zero.11
11Goeree, Anderson and Holt (1998) discuss the comparative static properties of all-pay
auctions with complete information. These properties motivate them to consider ’noisy’
players, as in Goeree, Anderson and Holt (1998) and in Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998).
74 Minority ownership
Consider now a minority shareholding θij > 0 of ﬁrm i in ﬁrm j for one
ﬁrm i and one ﬁrm j. The ownership share of ﬁrm i in ﬁrm j changes the
valuation ﬁrm i attributes to the prize compared to the operating surplus, and
the resulting valuation depends on the bidding behavior of other ﬁrms. Let
Fk(x) be the cumulative distribution function of bids by ﬁrm k. To illustrate,
adopt for a moment the tie-breaking rule that i wins if xi =m a x {...xk,...},
and let j have no mass point at xi. Then (3) for a given xi can be rewritten











where the ﬁrst two terms are i’s operating proﬁt and the second two terms
are i’s proﬁtf r o ms i l e n ts h a r e - o w n e r s h i p . A ni n c r e a s ei nxi has a direct








A ﬁrst result is
Proposition 2 If θij > 0 with i<jand j ≥ 3 or if θij > 0 in ﬁrm j<i
for i ≥ 3, the bidding strategies as in Proposition 1 constitute an equilibrium.
Such shareholdings do not change operating proﬁts or overall proﬁts of ﬁrms
in the equilibrium.
Proof. Note that Wk = πk = pkvk − xk for all k 6= i,a n dWi = pivi − xi
+θij[pjvj − xj].S u p p o s ea l lﬁrms anticipate that all other ﬁrms choose the
candidate equilibrium bid strategies as in Proposition 1. All ﬁrms k 6= i
8maximize πk = pkvk − xk. Then the candidate equilibrium strategies in
Proposition 1 are the optimal replies for all k 6= i. Moreover, (5) and (6),
together with Fk(0) = 1 for all k ∈ {3,4,...n}\{i}, implies that pk =0for
k ≥ 3. Therefore, Wi also reduces to Wi = pivi − xi = πi,m a k i n gFi as in
Proposition 1 an optimal reply.
Intuitively, if ﬁrms own shares in inactive ﬁrms, or if inactive ﬁrms own
shares in other ﬁrms, this does not change the incentives of active ﬁrms.
Interesting implications of a ﬁrm’s ownership shares in another ﬁrm can be
expected only for ownership shares θ12 and θ21.T h ec a s eθ12 > 0 is considered
ﬁrst.
Proposition 3 (i) if v1 − θ12v2 ∈ (v2,v 1] then an equilibrium exists with
πk = Wk =0for all k ≥ 2 and




Share ownership in this interval is not mutually proﬁtable. (ii) if v1−θ12v2 ∈
(v3,v 2), then an equilibrium exists with πk = Wk =0for all k ≥ 3,
W2 = π2 =( 1 + θ12)v2 − v1
and




Share ownership in this interval is mutually proﬁtable iﬀ θ12v2 > 2(v1 − v2).
A proof is in the Appendix. Intuitively, if θ12 is small as in (i) then the
nature of the equilibrium is not changed, compared to θ12 =0 .O n l yﬁrms 1
and 2 compete against each other. Firm 1’s valuation of winning equals the
diﬀerence between its own operating surplus v1 and θ12v2 ( w h a ti tg e t sf r o m
9losing), compared to θ12 =0 . Firm 2 has the same prize of winning, but
the prize for ﬁrm 1 is reduced. The diﬀerence between valuations of winning
still determines the prize for the ﬁrm with the higher valuation, the ﬁrm
with the second highest valuation competes actively but makes zero proﬁt,
and all other ﬁr m sp r e f e rt ob ei n a c t i v e .I fθ12 is suﬃciently large to make
v3 <v 1−θ12v2 <v 2 as in (ii), when ﬁrms 1 and 2 compete, ﬁrm 2 still values
the prize of winning at v2. However, playing against ﬁrm 2, ﬁrm 1 gains only
v1 − θ12v2 if the prize is awarded to 1 and not to 2, and this net prize of
winning is so small that ﬁrm 2 values winning the prize more highly than
ﬁrm 1. The ﬁrms switch ranks as regards prize valuations. As known from
Proposition 1, the rank and the diﬀerences in valuations determine payoﬀs.
Firm 2 receives a positive operating proﬁta n dﬁrm 1 receives an operating
proﬁt of zero, and a positive overall proﬁt, due to its shareholdings in ﬁrm 2.
Proposition 4 If v1 − θ12v2 ∈ ((1 − θ12
2 )v3, 1
2) then an equilibrium exists
in which only ﬁrms 2 and 3 are active, and with πk = Wk =0for all
k =2 ,4,5,...n, π1 =0 , W2 = π2 = v2−v3 and W1 = θ12(v2−v3).M o r e o v e r ,
an ownership share of this size is mutually proﬁtable if and only if v1 −v2 <
v2 − v3.
A proof is in the Appendix. The most interesting result in Proposition 4
is the possibility that ﬁrm 1, which has the highest operating surplus from
winning the auction, becomes passive and still makes higher proﬁts than in
the equilibrium with θ12 =0 . Intuitively, without minority shareholdings,
ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 may compete tightly and dissipate most, or all, of the op-
erating surplus that can be obtained from winning the prize in the auction.
If, instead, ﬁrm 1 successfully commits to not making bids, the diﬀerence
10between ﬁrm 2’s and ﬁrm 3’s valuations of winning describes the total rent
that is allocated among ﬁrms, and, if this diﬀerence is larger than the diﬀer-
ence in the valuations v1 and v2 of the prize for ﬁrms 1 and 2, total industry
proﬁtg o e su pf o rt h i sθ12,c o m p a r e dt oθ12 =0 .E v e nﬁrm 1, and its owners,
can beneﬁt from this, as all this rent accrues in ﬁrm 2 and ﬁrm 1 receives
a share in these proﬁts that equals its ownership share in ﬁrm 2. The only
problem is to make ﬁrm 1 credibly commit to bidding zero.
As discussed in Proposition 4, this will work only if ﬁrm 1’s ownership
share in ﬁrm 2 is suﬃciently large, if the diﬀerence in the valuations of the
prize for ﬁrms 1 and 2 is small, and if the diﬀerence in prizes between v2 and
v3 is larger than the diﬀerence between v1 and v2, but also not too large.
To see that the parameter range with θ12 < 1/2 for which v1 − θ12v2 >
(1 − θ12
2 )v3 h o l d si sn o n - e m p t y ,n o t et h a tt h i sc o n d i t i o nr e d u c e st ov3 > 2
3v2
for (v1 − v2) → 0 and θ12 =1 /2.
The result is based on a mechanism that is explored in a paper by Baye,
Kovenock and deVries (1993). They consider the problem of an auction
designer to be whether to exclude the bidder who -in terms of this paper-
has the highest operating surplus from winning the prize. The designer is
interested in high total eﬀort which is increasing in the valuation of win-
ning of the bidder who has the second highest valuation, and decreasing in
the diﬀerence between the highest and the second highest valuation of win-
ning. In the absence of ﬁrms’ ownership shares in other ﬁrms, excluding the
bidder with the highest operating proﬁt is worthwhile from the designer’s
perspective if it improves on competitive balance, and hence, total expected
eﬀort. In Proposition 4, the contestant with the highest operating surplus
may choose an ownership structure that commits himself to not being active
11in the contest, if this suﬃciently increases competitive imbalance. Unlike the
contest designer who likes much eﬀort, and hence, likes to increase competi-
tive balance, the competitors themselves are interested in generating a high
competitive imbalance, as a larger diﬀerence between them reduces contest
eﬀort.
Consider now the intermediate range of θ12 that is not covered by Propo-
sitions 3 and 4.
Proposition 5 If v1−θ12v2 ∈ ((1− θ12
2 )v3,v 3) no equilibrium exists in which
only two ﬁrms are active. For any equilibrium, a suﬃcient condition for θ12
in this range to be mutually proﬁtable is v1 − v2 <v 2 − v3.
A proof is in the Appendix. Intuitively, if ﬁrm 1 loses, it still cares about
whether ﬁrm 2 or some other ﬁrm (e.g., ﬁrm 3) wins the prize. Competing
against ﬁrm 2, ﬁrm 1 is not very agressive as some of the gains of ﬁrm 2
make ﬁrm 1 also gain, due to the shareholdings. However, competing against
ﬁrm 3, ﬁrm 1’s stake is larger and equal to the full valuation v1 of the prize.
T h ef a c tt h a tﬁrm 1 is not indiﬀerent to whom it competes with generates an
additional discontinuity in the problem and makes it diﬃcult to address the
question of existence, or to characterize an equilibrium. An intuition for why
the minority share is mutually proﬁtable in an equilibrium if v1−v2 <v 2−v3
is based on the insight that bids higher than x = v3 will not occur in the
equilibrium, which yields some lower limit for ﬁrm 2’s operating proﬁts.
So far only proﬁtability aspects have been considered.
Proposition 6 Consider θ12 > 0: In the equilibria that are characterized in
Proposition 3 and 4, the social value V (θ12) <V(0).
12Proof. The result follows from p1(θ12 =0 )>p (θ12 > 0) for all θ12 > 0 and
p1(θ12 =0 )+p2(θ12 =0 )=1≥ p1(θ12 > 0) + p2(θ12 > 0) for all θ12 > 0.
If ﬁrm 1 owns a stake in ﬁrm 2, this makes ﬁrm 1 a less aggressive bidder,
up to the point where ﬁrm 1 becomes even fully inactive. Generally, this
m a k e si tl e s sl i k e l yt h a tﬁrm 1 which has the highest v1 wins, and, once only
ﬁrms 2 and 3 are active, it becomes possible that ﬁrm 3, that values the prize
by even less than ﬁrm 2 does, will win the prize.
The case θ21 > 0 is considered next.
Proposition 7 For θ21 ∈ [0,min{v2−v3
v1 , 1
2}) an equilibrium exists with the
following properties: only ﬁrms 1 and 2 make positive bids. W1 = π1 =
v1 −(v2 −θ21v1), W2 = θ12π1, π2 =0 , Wk = πk =0for all k>2.M o r e o v e r ,
social value V is increasing in θ21 on this interval.
A proof is in the Appendix. If ﬁrm 2 owns some shares in ﬁrm 1, and if
the ownership share is small enough, ﬁrms 1 and 2 will remain to be the only
ﬁrms that are active in the equilibrium. Hence, all other ﬁrms’ operating
proﬁts are zero. Moreover, as long as ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 are the only active
ﬁrms, ﬁrm 2’s ownership share in ﬁrm 1 reduces the overall value which ﬁrm
2 attributes to winning, as ﬁrm 2 receives θ21v1 even if ﬁrm 2 loses, and v2
if it wins. The overall value that ﬁrm 1 attributes to winning is unchanged.
Accordingly, as regards the bidding incentives, the share ownership in ﬁrm
1 is very similar to a reduction in ﬁrm 2’s valuation of winning. It increases
the diﬀerence in the two ﬁrms’ overall valuations of winning and increases
ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts. However, as ﬁrm 2 now owns a share in ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts,
ﬁrm 2 receives a share in ﬁrm 1’s operating proﬁt. Also, the increase in the
diﬀerence in overall valuation of winning makes it more likely that ﬁrm 1
wins the prize, and this increases V .
13For small ownership shares, this reasoning applies monotonically for any
further increase in the ownership share. However, as the diﬀerence in valu-
ations increases, the overall valuation of winning for ﬁrm 2 becomes smaller
a n ds m a l l e r .O n c ei td r o p sb e l o wv3, the nature of the equilibrium changes.
Firm 3 becomes an active player. At least, the equilibrium that underlies
Proposition 7 and is characterized in the proof of the proposition no longer
continues to exist. Given the candidate equilibrium strategies (19) and (20),
ﬁrm 3 would not remain inactive, but would bid higher than v2 − θ21v1.
There is again an intermediate range in which the equilibrium cannot
be one in which only two players are active, and it is diﬃcult to obtain a
closed form solution for an equilibrium in this range. However, the mutual
proﬁtability of shareholdings θ21 can again be limited from below:
Proposition 8 T h es u mo fo p e r a t i n gp r o ﬁts of ﬁr m s1a n d2i na ne q u i l i b -
rium with v2 − θ21v1 <v 3 is at least equal to v1 − v3.
Again, the proof is in the Appendix. The equilibrium can be fully char-
acterized as soon as θ21 becomes suﬃciently large and also yields an intuition









then an equilibrium exists in which only ﬁrms 1 and 3 are active. The sum
of overall proﬁts for ﬁrms 1 and 2 are v1 − v3,a n dV (θ21) is smaller than
V (0) iﬀ v3(v1 − v3) <v 2(v1 − v2).
A ss h o w ni nt h ep r o o fi nt h eA p p e n d i x ,ﬁrm 2 may become inactive
in the bidding process if it owns a suﬃciently large share in ﬁrm 1. Such
14shareholdings reduce the overall value that ﬁrm 2 attributes to winning vis-
a-vis ﬁrm 1, and may reduce this value suﬃciently to make ﬁrm 3 an active
bidder. As a consequence, only ﬁrms 1 and 3 compete actively, and ﬁrm 2
enjoys some passive income from share ownership. This is proﬁtable from
the joint perspective of ﬁrms 1 and 2 as it increases ﬁrm 1’s operating proﬁt
to v1 −v3,a n dk e e p sﬁrm 2’s operating proﬁta tz e r o .H o w e v e r ,w h e nﬁrm 2
becomes inactive, ﬁrm 3 becomes active. This has a negative impact for ﬁrm
2: with all ﬁrms except ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 inactive, if ﬁrm 2 does not win, ﬁrm
1w i n sa n dﬁrm 2 receives some shareholdership returns. Once ﬁrm 3 is active,
ﬁrm 3 may also win, in which case ﬁrm 2 does not receive shareholdership
returns. The condition (10) makes sure that the shareholdership returns from
ownership in ﬁrm 1 are suﬃciently large in the equilibrium in which only ﬁrm
1a n dﬁrm 3 are active so as to make it not attractive for ﬁr m2t om a k ea
positive bid.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Minority shareholdings can, but need not, increase ﬁrms’ and industry proﬁt
in markets of the all-pay auction type. Particularly if the silent shareholdings
a ﬁrm purchases in another ﬁrm increase the diﬀerence in valuation of winning
for the ﬁrms who have the highest operating surpluses from winning the
competition, the acquisition of such shareholdings is likely to beneﬁtt h e
owners of both ﬁrms that are involved in this acquisition. For a proﬁti n c r e a s e
to emerge from silent ownership, the ﬁrm that has the highest operating
surplus from winning the auction (the ‘strongest’ ﬁrm) may purchase shares
in the ﬁrm that has the second highest operating surplus from winning or
15vice versa. The ﬁrst type of share purchase typically decreases the eﬃciency
of the prize allocation in the auction, the second type of share purchase
can increase eﬃciency. This result is of interest for competition authorities
when evaluating silent shareholdings. Generally, silent share ownership is
not neutral with respect to ﬁrm proﬁts and eﬃciency, and ﬁrm proﬁts and
eﬃciency need not be aligned. Competition authorities may treat proﬁtable
share ownership diﬀerently, depending whether a stronger ﬁrm that has a
higher operating surplus from winning the competition purchases shares in
aw e a k e rﬁrm, or whether a weaker ﬁrm, i.e., a ﬁrm that has a smaller
operating surplus from winning the competiton purchases shares in a stronger
competitor.
6 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . (i) For v1 − θ12v2 ∈ (v2,v 1) consider the cumu-
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v1−θ12v2 for x ∈ [0,v 2]
1 for x>v 2
(12)
as candidate equilibrium strategies. Note that πk(xk)=F1(xk)F2(xk)vk −
xk < 0 for all xk > 0. Hence, Fk(0) = 1 is an optimal reply for k =3 ,...n.
Next, using W2 = π2 and inserting (11) in (2), π2(x2)=x2
v2v2 − x2 =0for
all x2 ∈ [0,v 2] and equal to v2 − x2 < 0 for x2 >v 2. Accordingly, any mixed
strategy F2 on the support [0,v 2] is optimal for ﬁrm 2, in particular F2 as
16in (12). Finally, inserting the candidate equilibrium cumulative distribution
functions for k =2 ,...n, W1(x1) becomes equal to v1 − v2 − θ12
(v2)2
2(v1−θ12v2)
for x1 ∈ (0,v 2],a n de q u a lt ov1 − x1 − θ12
(v2)2
2(v1−θ12v2) for x1 >v 2, and hence,
strictly smaller for x1 >v 2 than for x1 ∈ (0,v 2]. This makes any bid x1 ∈
(0,v 2) optimal and makes the candidate equilibrium strategy F1(x) as in (11)
an optimal reply.
As regards mutual proﬁtability, the sum of proﬁts is π1 + π2 =( v1 −
θ12v2) − v2 <v 1 − v2.
(ii) For v1−θ12v2 ∈ (v3,v 2), consider the following cumulative distribution







v2 for x ∈ [0,v 1 − θ12v2)








v1−θ12v2 for x ∈ [0,v 1 − θ12v2)
1 for x>v 1 − θ12v2.
(14)
Consider whether these are optimal replies to each other. Note that Wk =
πk(xk)=F1(xk)F2(xk)vk − xk < 0 for all xk > 0.H e n c e , xk =0is an
optimal reply for k =3 ,...n.N e x t , W2(x2)=π2(x2)=( 1 − v1−θ12v2
v2 +
x
v2)v2 − x = v2 − [v1 − θ12v2] for all x2 ∈ [0,v 1 − θ12v2] and smaller for any
x2 >v 1−θ12v2. Accordingly, any randomization F2 on [0,v 1−θ12v2] is optimal
for ﬁrm 2, and this makes F2 as in (14) an optimal reply. Finally, inserting
the candidate equilibrium cumulative distribution functions for k =2 ,...n,
W1(x1)=θ12(v2 − v1+θ12v2
2 ) for x1 ∈ [0,v 2], and smaller for x1 >v 2.T h i s
makes any randomization of x1 on (0,v 2) optimal and makes F1 as in (13)
an optimal reply.
17As regards the sum of operating proﬁts, W1(θ12)+( 1− θ12)W2(θ12)=
π1 + π2 =( v1 − θ12v2) − v2 >v 1 − v2 iﬀ 2(v1 − v2) <θ 12v2. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Firms k =2 ,...n maximize Wk = πk =
pkvk − xk.S u p p o s e ﬁrm 1 abstains from bidding. Then the results from
Proposition 1 apply to the set of ﬁrms {2,3,...n} with ﬁrms 2 and 3 replacing
ﬁrms 1 and 2. The unique equilibrium is then characterized by the mixed













and xi ≡ 0 for all i =4 ,...n.F o rﬁrm 1 the choice x1 ≡ 0 is indeed optimal
given (15) and (16). Firm 1’s payoﬀ from bidding x1 ≥ 0 is







,( 1 7 )
where E(x2) denotes the expected eﬀort of ﬁrm 2.T h el a s tt e r mi sﬁrm 1’s
share in ﬁrm 2’s expected proﬁt as a function of x1,g i v e nt h a tﬁrms k>3
choose xk =0 . Substituting (15) and (16) into (17) yields
x1v2 − x1v3 +( x1)2
v3v2
v1 − x1 + θ12
∙







.( 1 8 )




2v3,w h i c hi sa l w a y sf u l ﬁlled, as θ12 < 1/2 and v1 ≥ v2. Hence, this
function is strictly convex in x1 and has its global maximum on the interval
[0,v 3] either at x1 =0or at x1 = v3. From inserting x1 =0and x1 = v3 in
(17) one gets π1(0) = θ12(v2−v3),a n dπ1(v3)=v1−v3−θ12v3/2.A c c o r d i n g l y ,
18x1 =0is optimal given (15) and (16) if θ12(v2 −v3) >v 1 −v3 −θ12v3/2,a n d
this is equivalent to v1 − θ12v2 < (1 − θ12
2 )v3. This shows that F1(0) = 1 is
indeed an optimal reply.
As regards the sum of the operating proﬁts, π1(0)+π2(0) = v1 −v2,a n d
π1(θ12)+π2(θ12)=v2 − v3 for θ12 with (v1 − θ12v2) ∈ ((1 − θ12
2 )v3, 1
2). ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. R e t u r n i n gt ot h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 ,f o r
F1(0) = 1 = Fk(0) for k =4 ,...n,i fﬁrm 1 does not make positive bids, the
unique equilibrium cumulative distribution functions F2 and F3 are given
by (15) and (16). However, x1 = v3 becomes superior to x1 =0given
these strategies if v1 − θ12v2 ∈ ((1 − θ12
2 )v3,v 3). This shows that there is no
equilibrium in which only ﬁrms 2 and 3 make positive bids.
Consider next xk ≡ 0 for all k =3 ,...n.Ab i dˆ x1 ∈ (v3 −  ,v3) turns out
to be strictly dominated by x1 =   for suﬃciently small  ,w h a t e v e rﬁrm 2’s
strategy is. A choice x1 =   makes either ﬁrm 1 or ﬁrm 2 win. Hence, the
payoﬀ for ﬁrm 1 is
W1( ) ≥ θ12v2 −   − θ12E(x2).
If ﬁrm 1 choses ˆ x1 ∈ (v3 −  ,v3) then
W1(ˆ x1) ≤ v1 − (v3 −  ) − θ12E(x2).
Accordingly, W1( ) >W 1(ˆ x1) if θ12v2 − v1 + v3 > 0 for suﬃciently small  .
Moreover, x1 <v 3 −   also implies that x2 <v 3 −  
2 .A c c o r d i n g l y , ﬁrm 3
could make a positive payoﬀ, for instance, by choosing x3 = v3 −  
4,a n d ,
hence, F3(0) = 1 is not optimal. This shows that there is no equilibrium in
which only ﬁrms 1 and 2 are active.
Finally, an equilibrium in which only ﬁr m s1a n d3a r ea c t i v ei sn o t
feasible. W2 =0in such an equilibrium. Moreover, neither ﬁrm 1 nor ﬁrm
193 would make bids higher than v3. Hence, ﬁrm 2 could make positive proﬁt
by making a bit in the interval x2 ∈ (v3,v 2). Hence, a contradiction.
Note that ﬁrm 3 (or even ﬁrms k>3) would never make bids higher
than the operating surplus it could obtain from winning: xk ≤ v3 for k ≥ 3.
Accordingly, the prize goes to ﬁrm 1 or ﬁrm 2 with probability 1 if at least one
of them makes a bid equal to v3+  for small positive  .F u r t h e r ,i fFk(x)=1
for all x>v 3 and k ≥ 3,t h e nﬁrm 1 will never bid more than v3 +(  /2).
Accordingly, for ﬁrm 2, W2 = π2 ≥ v2 − (v3 +  ).F u r t h e r ,ﬁrm 1 maximizes
W1 = p1v1−x1+θ12π2 = π1 +θ12π2. This has a lower bound equal to θ12π2,
for instance for a choice x1 =0 . This implies that π1 = W1 − θ12π2 ≥ 0.I n
turn, π1 + π2 >π 2 ≥ v2 − v3 −  . ¤











with x2 ∈ [0,v 2 − θ21v1] (20)
and xk ≡ 0 for all k =3 ,...n constitute an equilibrium for the following
reasons. Firm 1 values winning by v1 and attributes a value of zero to
the event of any other ﬁrm winning the prize. For (20) and xk ≡ 0 for
all k =3 ,...n ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ is equal to v1 − (v2 − θ21v1) for any x1 ∈
(0,v 2−θ21v1], and smaller than this payoﬀ for all other choices of x1. Hence,
(19) is an optimal reply for ﬁrm 1. It is assumed in Proposition 7 that
θ21 <
v2−v3
v1 . Hence, ﬁrms k =3 ,...n value winning the prize by less than
v2 −θ21v1. Given (19), these ﬁrms strictly maximize their payoﬀ by a choice
of eﬀort xk ≡ 0. It remains to show that (20) is an optimal reply for ﬁrm 2.
Given (19) for ﬁrm 1 and xk ≡ 0 for k =3 ,..., ﬁrm 2’s payoﬀ is W2(x2)=
20F1(x2)v2 +( 1− F1(x2))θ21v1 − x2 − θ21E(x1), and can be rewritten as
W2(x2)=F1(x2)(v2 − θ21v1) − x2 + θ21(v1 − E(x1)).( 2 1 )
The third term on the right-hand side in (21) is a constant with respect to x2,
and is strictly positive, and it does not matter for ﬁrm 2’s optimization choice.
Hence, ﬁrm 2 behaves like a ﬁrm with a valuation of the prize that equals
(v2−θ21v1). Given (19), this makes all x2 ∈ [0,v 2−θ21v1] yield the same payoﬀ
for ﬁrm 2, and this payoﬀ is larger than for any other x2 / ∈ [0,v 2 − θ21v1].
Any mixed strategy on the support [0,v 2 − θ21v1] is then an optimal reply.
T h ee q u i l i b r i u mt h a ti sd e s c r i b e db y( 1 9 )a n d( 2 0 )a n dxk =0for all other
ﬁrms k =3 ,...n has the properties outlined in the proposition. Aggregate
payoﬀ of ﬁrms is v1 − (v2 − θ21v1), and this is strictly increasing in θ21.




∂θ21 > 0. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 .Consider v2 − θ21v1 ∈ (v3 − θ21
v3
2 ,v 3).F i r m s
k ≥ 3 will not bid higher than xk = v3. For this reason, any bid ˆ x2 >v 3 by
ﬁrm 2 is dominated by a bid in the range x2 ∈ (v3, ˆ x2). Accordingly, ﬁrm 2
will not make a bid higher than v3 +  . In turn, this implies that ﬁrm 1 will
not bid higher than v3+2 . Accordingly, ﬁrm 1’s operating proﬁt is bounded
from below by v1 − v3 −  .M o r e o v e r ,a sW2 = π2 + θ21π1, this overall proﬁt
is bounded from below by θ21π1,a st h i so v e r a l lp r o ﬁtc a nb ea t t a i n e db y
x2 =0 . Hence, π2 is bounded from below by 0. Accordingly, the sum of
operating proﬁts must be bounded from below by v1 −v3 − . Now consider
  → 0. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 . Suppose that ﬁrm 2 does not make positive
bids: x2 ≡ 0. Then the equilibrium among the remaining ﬁrms is character-
ized in analogy to Proposition 1 as in Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996),













for x ∈ [0,v 3].( 2 3 )
For (22) and (23) x2 ≡ 0 is indeed optimal for ﬁrm 2 if conditions (10) hold.
Firm 2’s overall payoﬀ from bidding x2 ≥ 0 is









.( 2 4 )




v1 − v3 + x2
v1
v2 − x2 + θ21
∙












This expression is a quadratic function in x2. The quadratic term enters
with a positive sign, as v2
v3v1 >θ 21
1
2v3 by the second condition in (10). The
function is, therefore, strictly convex and has its global maximum on the
interval [0,v 3] either at 0 or at v3. From inserting x2 =0and x2 = v3
in (24) one gets π1(0) = θ21(v1 − v3),a n dπ1(v3)=v2 − v3 − θ21
v3
2 .T h e
choice x2 =0is optimal if θ21(v1 − v3) − v2 + v3 + θ21
v3
2 > 0,w h i c hc a n
also be written equivalently as the ﬁrst condition in (10). The ﬁrms’ proﬁts
(including earnings from ownership shares) in this equilibrium become equal
to π1 + π2 = v1 − v3 and πk =0for all k ≥ 3. Industry proﬁt is increased,
now from v1 − v2 to v1 − v3.
Social value is higher in the range of θ21 for which ﬁrm 2 becomes inactive
than for θ21 =0if V (θ21)=1− v3
2v1
v1−v3
v1 > 1− v2
2v1
v1−v2
v1 = V (0).T h i si st r u e
if v3(v1 − v3) <v 2(v1 − v2) ¤
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